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PACIFIC ISLANDS REPORT Pacific Islands Development Program/East-West Center SOLOMONS POLLS AND THE PNG EXPERIENCE Jon Fraenkel HONIARA, Solomon Islands (Solomons Star, April 24) -- The 2006 Solomon Islands election was the seventh since independence, and the first since the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands arrived in July 2003. The coalition between Prime Minister Sir Allen Kemakeza’s Peoples Alliance Party (PAP) and the Association of Independent Members of Parliament (AIMP) went to the polls confident of victory. This was the first ever Solomon Islands government to serve out its full term in office. Yet the result proved a crushing defeat for Mr. Kemakeza and his party. Eight of his 20 ministers lost their seats, the Prime Minister’s personal vote on Savo/Russells fell to half its 2001 level, and his PAP was reduced to only three seats. The celebrated ‘numbers man’ of 2001-6 did not even submit his nomination for the premiership election. As in the 1993, 1997 and 2001 elections, voters’ choices at the local level exerted little control over who formed the government. This was the least party-centred election ever witnessed in Solomon Islands. Only 16 of the 50 elected MPs submitted a party affiliation with their nominations, and no party secured more than four seats (leaving aside the non-party AIMP grouping). With no clear victor, the composition of government was again inevitably decided at the ‘second election’ once MPs descended on Honiara, and set themselves up in rival hotel camps; at the Iron Bottom Sound Hotel, the Flamingo Restaurant at the Honiara Hotel and, belatedly, the Pacific Casino Hotel. For some, the best answer for the future is greater regulation of the party system, drawing inspiration from neighbouring Papua New Guinea. In 2001-2, PNG introduced an Organic Law on Political Parties and Candidates which constrains MPs from switching camps and requires registration of party affiliations. But the jury is still out on the PNG experiment. A more workable alternative, as in Kiribati or neighbouring Bougainville, might be to introduce some directly elective element into the choice of Prime Minister and/or government. Continuing a long-run trend in the Solomon Islands, the polls produced a sizeable shake-out of old members. Half of those elected are new members. MP turnover-rates varied widely across the country. In Choiseul and Western Province all the MPs bar one were returned to office. On Isabel and in Honiara, all the incumbents lost their seats. On Malaita, Guadalcanal and Makira, the picture was much more varied. Since the 1990s, many commentators have viewed sweeping changes in parliament’s make-up as a sign of popular backing for reform. Having 52% new members in 1997 was widely seen as a sign of the deep unpopularity of the older incumbent members. Part of the reason for this view was because of the way government funds were used under the 1990-93 Mamaloni government to assist MPs to retain their seats, resulting in the lowest level of defeat of sitting members witnessed at any post-independence election in 1993. But the impact was not long-lived. An extraordinary 62% of those elected in 2001 were new members. By contrast, the 2006 polls have produced a better balance between more experienced and newer members (see Table).
The 2006 elections were highly competitive. 453 candidates stood for election, an average of 9.1 per constituency (up from 6.6 in 2001). One result was that the average share of the vote secured by victors fell to 30.8%. Only two candidates obtained over 50% of the vote, although Job Dudley Tausinga who had obtained 74% of the vote in 2001 was this time returned unopposed. Half of all MPs obtained less than 30% of the vote, the lowest figure since independence. Some suggest that the answer is to introduce Australian-style preferential voting instead of the current first-past-the-post system, in an effort to ensure that victors receive majorities in their constituencies. In preferential voting systems, as recently adopted in Fiji and Papua New Guinea, voters mark the candidates 1, 2, 3, 4 etc. If no candidate gets an outright majority (50%+1), the lowest polling candidate is eliminated, and his or her votes are redistributed in accordance with voters’ second preferences. This process of elimination of lowest polling candidates and redistribution of votes continues until one candidate gets over 50% of the vote, or until ballots are exhausted. Fiji adopted an over-elaborate version of that system in 1997, which did not work well at the 1999 and 2001 polls. PNG adopted a simpler ‘limited preferential voting system’ (LPV) in the wake of the 2002 general elections. Those considering this option for the Solomon Islands would do well to watch carefully the first big trial for that system at the PNG general elections scheduled for 2007.
Why did so many candidates contest at the 2006 polls? One reason was the absence of clear political issues at the local level separating the candidates. Where elections pit acknowledged conservative against reformist candidates or where other popularly accepted issues divide political parties, pressure is often exerted on weaker candidates to step aside to avoid splitting the vote. If there is no common consensus about what the electoral issues are (or if the focus is solely on the personal integrity of candidates), contests become a free-for-all, without much restraint on the number of contestants entering the race. Another reason why there were so many candidates was probably the increasing usage of ‘dummy’ candidates in 2006. In many constituencies, the major contestants could rely only on local pockets of support or, even if they had broader support, faced a likely threat from rival candidates who could draw on the support of this or that village or community. By encouraging dummies to split those rival candidates votes, the more cunning or well-financed contestants could increase their chances of victory. Under a preferential voting system, those tactics might work less well. But as some of the recent PNG by-elections using LPV have shown, it remains possible under those systems to use dummies to split rivals votes. In systems where political parties are allowed considerable control over the movement of preference votes (as in Fiji), use of allied candidates to split rivals’ votes can become an even more effective tactic than under first-past-the-post systems. There is a strong case for further reform of Solomon Islands governance institutions. The shift from the multiple- to single ballot box system was a great success. Only around 1.5% of votes were invalid. The absence yet again of any women in parliament remains a continuing area for concern. But the elections have given the new parliament a more representative membership than that elected in 2001, and – although this article has been written before the result of the premiership election is known – hopefully also given the new government the will to govern the country in a more effective way than its predecessor. Dr Jon Fraenkel is a Senior Research Fellow at the Pacific Institute of Advanced Studies in Development & Governance (PIAS-DG) at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, and author of ‘The Manipulation of Custom; From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands’ (Victoria University Press & Pandanus 2004). April 25, 2006 Solomon Star: http://www.solomonstarnews.com/ Copyright © 2006 Solomon Star. All Rights Reserved |
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