By T. Suka Mangisi

(January 24, 2008) - The possibilities for a new China-Taiwan dynamic being played out in the Pacific or indeed globally, has emerged after the pro-China, Kuomintang (KMT) win over the past weekend. Reading the article "Taiwan Elections Could Bring Changes To Relations With The Pacific Islands," the first thing that comes to mind if the KMT seeks closer relations with mainland China is that Beijing would undoubtedly push for an end to the diplomatic relations Taiwan pursues with certain countries around the world let alone the six Pacific Islands. Indeed, the commentator in the piece, Associate Professor Chien-Wen, is right by suggesting that Taiwanese and Chinese aid can be merged in this new paradigm, so that there would be more effective usage towards development in the Pacific region because of no, or a lack of, competition for recognition between the two Chinas. In doing so however, PRC [People’s Republic of China], as it has always maintained, must be the only China, which means, Taiwan must agree to be subordinate to Beijing, at least politically, to a similar extent as Hong Kong or Macao. If a "One China – Two Systems" model is applied to Taiwan, Taiwan’s defence and foreign affairs will be directed from Beijing. And in doing so, Taiwan would likely be required to cease its search for diplomatic recognition. Once this issue is settled, then the afterthoughts for harmonising ODA to the Pacific, legal and monetary system issues, domestic law enforcement, customs and immigration policies as well as delegations to international organisations and other events, can be pursued. In this light however, some analysts, as cited in the article, suggest that where Cross Strait relations improve, China could consent to Taiwan maintaining its diplomatic allies such as those in the Pacific. In my mind, this should not and cannot be an option for Beijing to consider as it would then mean it would allow Taiwan to be recognized as a separate state to Mainland China and not a province, or a possible Special Administrative Region, or the like, of the People’s Republic.

Now if this situation comes to fruition and both China and Taiwan are in agreement, we can then expand our purview to see the ramifications on the Asia-Pacific as a whole. This would have implications for Japan and the US via their security treaty since Cross Strait relations would be essentially cured of any animosity to which the treaty was expanded to draw Japan in to a possible cross strait conflict that would legally involve US forces. It is no secret that the KMT leadership had visited China whilst in opposition and was wholeheartedly welcomed by Beijing. Now that the KMT have won the parliamentary majority, this relation can be expected to get warmer as the KMT pursues closer relations with China as now mandated by a sizeable part of the Taiwanese electorate. Socio-politically, it seems Taiwan as a nation wishes closer relations with China.

The sticky point would be how would Taiwan respond to demands from Beijing to give up its pursuit of independence and therefore its diplomatic allies. I am not sure whether this was an issue raised during the elections but based on the article, it seems the Taiwanese voter agreed to the KMT platform for the pursuit of closer relations with China, because of economic reasons. This, as it were, was a result of President Chen Shui Bien’s failure in his managing of the Taiwanese economy. I am not sure though how readily the Taiwanese electorate would want to give up their political independence as Beijing would undoubtedly seek.

At present, to be sure then, a quasi-independence model of sorts must be created which would give Taiwan status equivalent to Hong Kong or Macao; economically independent yet politically integrated into China proper.

The Pacific region had also witnessed a change in government in the Republic of the Marshall Is., (RMI). The President-elect, had aired his wish to cut relations with Taiwan in favour of China. As expected, Taiwan was readily promising more monies for RMI in which in return as it seemed, RMI reiterated its recognition of Taiwan as an independent state. I had expected at that time that China would have also been equally strong in its lobbying for RMI’s recognition of Beijing’s "One-China Policy". China may not have actively wooed the RMI during the lead-up to its Presidential elections as it may have opted to hedge its bets on a landslide parliamentary election for the KMT in Taiwan and therefore even though there had been a declaration of recognition between RMI and Taiwan, it would not matter so greatly given that the Taiwanese government would be considerably weakened in the legislature. Indeed, a KMT victory at Presidential elections in a couple of months would prove Beijing’s wait wise. Having said this, in the end, the implications for the 6 Pacific Islands recognizing Taiwan is not grave. These island states would undoubtedly seek relations with mainland China and vice-versa and China together with Taiwan would work hand-in-hand to still maintain the "Eastward wind" blowing over the region by way of political influence. By this I mean that a new harmonized and strengthened Chinese / Taiwanese aid strategy would turn from competing against each other, to competing against other donors in the Pacific. In the end, the Pacific region as a whole will win with much needed aid in return for propping Chinese interests internationally. Look East and Look North policies look to still being maintained.

If the foregoing becomes a reality, it would be a boon for the Pacific. There will be less tension with no Cross Strait difficulties, which would, then exclude the US and Japan from interfering in that strategic area. The Pacific will still continue to be a stage for big power competition but now with a possible greater and stronger China, the current good relations it shares with the islands should only get stronger.

The islands however must still be vigilant against a strengthened China because in the end, China's economics leads its politics. Political power is enhanced by the economic growth it is experiencing. This means, China’s political clout internationally is powered by the strength of its record-sustaining economic growth. Economically therefore, and in the rigmarole of trade negotiations and transactions within the purview of the WTO, the islands do not factor too highly on China's agenda. As such, with regards to international trade and on environmental issues pertinent to island interests, we may see the strengthened China in this new paradigm go against island interests further into the future. Undoubtedly, it will, as it has always done, as with other powers in the Pacific, seek to allay Pacific regional discontent with them, by giving us more of the Yuan we need to develop.

To be clear, although in a different guise, the same cycle goes on.