 |
|
PACIFIC ISLANDS REPORT Pacific Islands Development Program/East-West Center |
||
|
The Contemporary Pacific Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2010 New Caledonia This year will be remembered for what happened in Noumea and nearby towns in the populous, multiethnic Southern Province soon after Bastille Day (14 July), the French national holiday. First, next to the Mwâ Kâ statue on the Baie de la Moselle (which has become a site for annual celebrations of the “common destiny” of the country’s diverse cultural communities), [End Page 476] two flags were hoisted up simultaneously: the colonial French tricolor and the flag created in 1984 as the emblem of the revolutionary Republic of Kanaky. That same day, at the Customary Senate in Nouville, the event was repeated, and two days later, the flag of Kanaky was raised alongside the tricolor at the French High Commission in the presence of visiting Prime Minister François Fillon, making the policy of coequal “double legitimacy” of indigenous and immigrant blocs official. Similar ceremonies followed in Dumbea, Mont-Dore, and Païta. For residents who support the Kanak independence movement and recalled the deaths suffered in the violent 1980s, as well as for French loyalists who believe in autonomy and reconciliation, the raising of the Kanak flag in the South was a deeply moving gesture of both closure and hope. But in the Northern Province, President Paul Néaoutyine of Palika (Parti de Libération Kanak) said it was nothing new, since the Kanak-ruled North (and Islands) provinces had flown both flags together since 1988. Rather than a big step forward, he saw it as a belated act that might actually hinder the creation of a common, single flag, as the 1998 Noumea Accord proposed. The man who suggested the idea of raising both flags in the South, after earlier regarding the Kanak flag as a terrorist symbol, was loyalist Pierre Frogier, president of the Southern Province and a deputy to Paris. He had lobbied French President Nicolas Sarkozy to support the dual emblems, since neither bloc could recognize itself in the other’s flag. He also speculated that once raised, the Kanak flag would never come down, and neither would the tricolor; hence, the country would remain autonomous within, rather than becoming independent from, France (NC, 1 July 2010). Legal scholar Guy Agniel pointed out that former French President Jacques Chirac had given a speech in Noumea under both flags in 2003, and since local loyalists lacked a flag of their own because of their ambivalent identity (one foot in New Caledonia and one in France), the flag of Kanaky would likely become, by default, the only “common flag” (NC, 16 July 2010). Kanak leader Rock Wamytan agreed: “This is no longer a flag of exclusion, it’s a flag that can bring us together ... to build a common destiny together” (Maclellan 2010b). Yet Palika, and others like President Philippe Gomès of the government executive of New Caledonia, still regarded one flag as the ultimate goal, and even Sarkozy said that flying both flags was “only one stage in a long process that should result in choosing a single flag” (NC, 1 July 2010). At this point in its political evolution since the Noumea Accord, the country is increasingly self-governing, under the flexible rubric of “autonomy,” so the difference between that status quo and complete independence is gradually narrowing to debates over identity symbols, rhetorical semantics, and specific devolutions of authority from Paris to Noumea. Which of those debates is more important? Some might say the last one, but the other two are equally significant in decolonization, which, as Frantz Fanon once said, “is the veritable creation of new men” (1968, 36). In fact, there is no legal definition of New Caledonia’s [End Page 477] current political status in French law; it is now a sui generis (unique) entity undergoing irreversible emancipation that is leading toward a possible referendum on full sovereignty in 2014 or soon thereafter. At present, a majority of eligible voters would likely not support complete independence. Kanak are a little less than half the population of 245,000, and some of them are loyalists. Those who oppose independence (but still support expanded autonomy) are engaged in two ongoing negotiations, one in the Congress and the other with Paris in regular meetings of the “signers” of the Matignon (1988) and Noumea (1998) peace accords. The former negotiation is among a spectrum of local political leaders, but the latter’s membership is restricted to the French prime minister and leaders of the two main local blocs, the pro-independence FLNKS (Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste), which is linked to the Socialist party, and the loyalist RPCR (Rassemblement pour la Calé-donie dans la République), which is led by Frogier and linked to Sarkozy’s metropolitan Gaullist party. President Philippe Gomès, of Calédonie Ensemble (Caledonia Together, or CE) and other centrist leaders have been able to participate in the signers meetings since their electoral success in 2004—but only to present information and viewpoints if they hold high political office, not to negotiate. This policy is not only empirically illogical because it treats France, indigenous Kanak, and migrant communities as if they are monolithic entities; it is also inconsistent because while the French prime ministers who signed the two peace accords were Socialists on both occasions, Gaullists have ruled France since then, just as centrists have begun to command high positions locally. The 2009 provincial elections in New Caledonia, which were based on a restricted electorate of long-term residents, chose a Congress that will have the option under the Noumea Accord of holding a referendum on independence as early as 2014, so that recurring issue was once again prominent this year. In January, referendums were held in the Caribbean French Overseas Departments of French Guyana and Martinique, and both said no to proposals to increase their autonomy (French Guyana by 70 percent and Martinique by 79 percent), partly because supporters had not provided specific details and partly because opponents had played on fears of losing French-financed social services. The “turning off the faucet” syndrome prevailed, and Sarkozy hailed the results as a clear indication that both departments want to remain integrated into the French republic. During a speech in Reunion, in the Indian Ocean, Sarkozy also urged New Caledonians to begin discussions well in advance of 2014 to find a consensual solution to the “post-accord” question (NC, 22 Jan 2010). But in February, Gomès went to Paris to argue that it was premature for the 2010 signers meeting to take up the matter formally because accord-mandated transfers of authority from Paris to Noumea were not yet completed, five-year development aid contracts between France and New Caledonia had to be renewed first, and an ongoing countrywide debate on how to improve the school system should be concluded because New [End Page 478] Caledonia is in the process of taking control over secondary education, and “school must be the crucible of the common destiny” (NC, 4 Feb 2010). Néaoutyine called increased maneuvering by political actors a “destabilization” of orderly progress toward fulfilling the Noumea Accord’s specified transfers of authority to New Caledonia (NC, 29 April 2010). He traveled to Paris to meet with the Socialist leader of the French Senate, while other signers made comparable trips to meet with French officials. Frogier complained that the latter seemed more interested in talking with independence parties than with loyalists, yet during the signers meeting in June, he and other Gaullists walked out while Gomès spoke. Palika’s rival in the FLNKS coalition, the Union Calédonienne (UC), pushed for a special study of what had or had not been accomplished so far under the Noumea Accord before discussing the “post-accord” era (NC, 12 May 2010). French Overseas Minister Marie-Luce Penchard visited New Caledonia in June to finalize the agenda and assure Néaoutyine that economic “rebalancing” would continue in order to promote “durable development” in the two relatively poorer Kanak-inhabited provinces. Néaoutyine replied, “The [Northern] provincial economic tissue is still young, so [French] accompaniment is vital for its development” (NC, 8 June 2010). In June, the signers committee agreed in Paris that both flags would be raised together for the 2011 Pacific Games in New Caledonia, but that they would continue to seek one flag; that the development contracts would remain at their current level for another five years; that two new commissions would study “post-accord” options, including forms of self-government adopted by other Pacific Island countries; that the transfer of powers would continue as specified in the Noumea Accord; that local hiring would be emphasized, though foreign “specialists” could be used to build both new nickel smelting projects; that the overall plan for mining development would be expanded to include more coordination by processing plants; and that other identity symbols such as the hymn and motto would be formally approved by Congress, while one flag and a country name still needed negotiation (NC, 25 June 2010). By July, Congress passed a law that favors hiring local residents when possible, which the FLNKS sees as crucial to creating a local citizenship, much like limiting voting on important issues to long-term residents (NC, 28 July 2010). Behind the scenes, the dichotomous blocs of the 1980s have continued to show signs of more complexity, but then France itself is known for such political metamorphoses: in France it is sometimes joked that all you need are two people to have factions and three to have fractures. Among loyalist parties the Gaullists and centrists are the main groupings, but Harold Martin’s centrist Avenir Ensemble (Future Together, or AE), which initially won considerable prominence in the 2004 provincial elections, later broke from Gomès’s CE. Gomès accused Martin of being too close to the Gaullists because Martin and other members belong to Sarkozy’s metropolitan Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), as does Frogier’s RPCR (making that combined acronym RUMP). [End Page 479] Martin’s AE complains that Gomès’s CE is too close to the FLNKS, though the CE’s relations with Palika and the UC vary depending on the issue. Both centrist parties tend to support a liberal socioeconomic agenda, increasing autonomy, and local control over mining and other economic actors, as do FLNKS members. Yet Frogier originated the proposal of coordination among nickel smelting plants to create more dynamic “synergy” among the Doniambo smelter near Noumea—run by long-established SLN (Société le Nickel, owned by the Eramet multinational)—and the two new plants being built at Goro in the South by Vale-Inco (now simply known as Vale) of Brazil and Canada, and at Koniambo in the North by Xstrata of Switzerland (in partnership with a provincially owned mining company that has close ties to Posco in South Korea). For example, Frogier said the costly delay in shipping northern nickel ore to Posco caused by a local land dispute could have easily been avoided if the three companies had coordinated better, and Northern Province mining director Andre Dang agreed (NC, 8 March 2010). Frogier also warned that the country needed to protect its resources from multinational corporations because New Caledonia has one-fourth of the world’s nickel reserves, and globalization can threaten local environments. In particular, he opposes Eramet-SLN’s desire to build yet a fourth processing plant at Prony and prefers that the three smelters share the mineral prospects there. It was RPCR founder Jacques Lafleur (deceased this year) who first gave Inco a permit to study Prony, which Gomès later gave to the SLN. Yet Frogier, formerly in favor of free trade, sounded almost center-left now: “For twenty years [some would say 120], the development of nickel has happened in a totally disorderly way, each working separately in the interest of his stockholders and creditors, not that of New Caledonia in the long term” (NC, 23 May 2010). The signers agreed, and Paris sent an expert to explore creating an overall smelting plan to complement the comprehensive mining plan supported by the FLNKS and centrists (NC, 12 Oct 2010). Vale-Inco’s Goro project has had its problems getting under way— from labor, communal, and environmental protests to a sulfuric acid spill in 2009 and the collapse of one of its Israeli-built towers in April—but its director says a thousand tons of ore have finally been partly processed. By 2013, as planned, its furnaces should produce 60,000 tons of smelted nickel and 4,500 tons of cobalt (NC, 12 Sept 2010). In the North, the Koniambo mining and smelting plant project is making similar progress, with the first prefabricated structures arriving from China and 2012 set as the date for production to begin. Unlike the small royalties the South and the country will earn from Goro, the North will ultimately own 51 percent of Koniambo (NC, 6 Sept, 23 Nov 2010). World nickel prices have revived since the 2008–2009 global economic crisis, and the distribution of nickel profits among the three provinces still favors the North and Islands disproportionately, to promote economic rebalancing (NC, 19 Sept 2010). New Caledonia has weathered the world recession reasonably well, [End Page 480] despite an initial fall in nickel prices. The economy grew 2 percent in 2009, about half the rate before the crisis, but is improving; job creation is up nearly 3 percent, and inflation is at 3 percent (NC, 8 June, 25 July 2010). Building the smelters at Goro and especially at Koniambo is creating new jobs because of Asian demand for stainless steel; other large development projects such as tourist resorts are also increasing opportunities for employment; and French state financial transfers have helped prop up consumption by government employees (30 percent of all jobs). Unfortunately, tourism has declined, especially from France, but it has always had difficulty passing about 100,000 visitors a year (only 1 percent of tourism in Oceania). Reasons are not hard to find and include a lack of serious planning, French state subsidies of over two billion US dollars a year that drive up prices, and dependence on nickel for over 90 percent of exports. Government-financed family allowances, for example, increased 22 percent this year, and metropolitan contract workers receive subsidies for air travel to and from France. Less than 3 percent of the population works in commercial agriculture or fishing, compared to two-thirds in service jobs (Maclellan 2010a; NC, 1 March 2010). The local government has resorted to regulating bank charges and fixing prices on basic commodities such as food staples (NC, 3 March 2010). Nickel gives New Caledonia more to work with economically than French Polynesia or Wallis and Futuna, but budget transfers from Paris have produced some high-level corruption cases (NC, 24 March 2010). Yet the devolution of self-governing powers to Noumea continues, notably in passing “country laws” (with official French approval) controlling mining, external trade, labor relations, primary and (soon) secondary education, telecommunications, and security aboard domestic air and sea transportation. More is to come, such as higher education, civil and commercial law, local citizenship, land reform, and administration of the Kanak Cultural Development Agency. A successful referendum on independence would give the country sovereign powers over the police, courts, defense, currency, and foreign affairs (PIR, 21 Sept 2010). The Noumea Accord proposed better integration of New Caledonia into its region, so this year the assemblies of New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia agreed to work more closely together to gain comparative perspectives on issues and procedures, and they also began to present a united front in the European Union, to which they elect delegates, to improve relations (NC, 26 Feb 2010; PIR, 23 March 2010). France is training New Caledonians to help in its embassies in Oceania, and Gomès expressed a wish to make New Caledonia—rather than the FLNKS alone (since 1991)—a full member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). The MSG sent a mission to New Caledonia in June but expressed concern over the slow rate of progress toward emancipation (PIR, 12 June 2010; NC, 19 Feb 2010). In September, the MSG-originated Melanesian Arts Festival was held in New Caledonia, with a local theme borrowed from the late Kanak leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou: “Our identity is ahead of [End Page 481] us” (PIR, 13 Sept 2010). In August, New Caledonia participated in the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) as an associate member, but PIF leaders told Gomès that more progress was needed under the Noumea Accord before full membership was possible (NC, 6 Aug 2010). Yet the visiting United Nations Decolonization Committee seemed amenable to what Gomès said was “a decolonization that is prepared, accompanied and undertaken, which contrasts with the situations in many former colonies in the world” (NC, 20 May 2010). Despite FLNKS criticisms of ongoing socioeconomic inequalities and protests outside the meeting hall by Oscar Temaru of Tahiti and other indigenous rights supporters, the committee chair from Saint Lucia in the Caribbean said East Timor is the only country on the UN decolonization list to become a sovereign state in several decades because of economic issues facing small countries. New Caledonia should consider all its options because “decolonization can have several facets such as independence and free association” (NC, 20 May 2010; PIR, 21 May 2010). The distinction between independence and free association remains the crux of deciding how close the word French “autonomy” can come to “full sovereignty,” which the Noumea Accord offers as a possible outcome. John Connell once suggested that the strong nationalist movement in New Caledonia, unlike in some other Melanesian countries where indigenous diversity is an ongoing challenge, resulted from colonial confrontation with a pro-French immigrant coalition (Connell 1988). Perhaps the obverse is also true: that if decolonization goes far enough, it will create new divisions and alliances among loyalists and Kanak nationalists. The so-called republican pact among French loyalists after the 2009 elections has unraveled as tensions have grown between Gomès’s (CE) centrists and those of Martin (AE), while Frogier’s RUMP seems to have accepted autonomy as the status quo and mutated somewhat to fit what the voters want—namely, more local control over their affairs without completely separating from France. Frogier said the South represents the country’s real “common destiny” because it is multiethnic and accordingly has more challenges to solve, despite its relative prosperity (NC, 26 March 2010). Disagreements over the flag and country name remain, as does some reluctance by the RUMP to support the centrists’ liberal socioeconomic development policies, but both Frogier and Gomès expressed satisfaction over the signers meeting (NC, 18 April, 1 July 2010). Gomès remains president of the executive cabinet, Martin of the Congress, and Frogier of the South, yet the UC sometimes works with RUMP/AE loyalists in opposition to Palika, which can align with Gomès’s CE on specific issues—all of which suggests that the blocs are less monolithic than the signers meetings allow (NC, 4 June 2010). Palika lost provincial assembly seats to the UC and the new union-affiliated Labor Party in 2009, especially in the Islands Province, and despite portrayals of various “personality” conflicts, the real differences are about visions of the future nation. Palika is socialist but willing to work within institutions, while Labor is more radical on both counts, and the UC has a tradition [End Page 482] of close ties to churches and to traditional custom. Repeated efforts (notably by the Polynesian party in the independence front) to reconcile Palika and the UC within the FLNKS have resulted only in a vague goal of electing a new coalition president (absent since 2001) sometime next year (NC, 6 Dec 2010). In the meantime, local nation-builders on various sides are beginning to study the forms of self-government that other former colonies in Oceania have adopted, including free association (NC, 21 Oct 2010). Double legitimacy plus common destiny may yet produce dignity for all. David Chappell is associate professor of Pacific Islands history at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. He studies the French Pacific territories, especially Kanaky New Caledonia. References Connell, John, 1988, Melanesian Nationalism: A Comparative Perspective on Decolonisation in New Caledonia, In New Caledonia: Essays in Nationalism and Dependency, edited by Michael Spencer, Alan Ward, and John Connell, 230–253. St Lucia, qld: University of Queensland Press. Fanon, Frantz. 1968. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. Maclellan, Nic. 2010a. Tourism in Trouble, Nickel Mining Improves. Islands Business Magazine, November. ———. 2010b. Under a New Flag. Islands Business Magazine, November. NC, Les Nouvelles-Calédoniennes, Daily. Noumea. http://www.lnc.nc PIR. Pacific Islands Report. http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport |
||
|