 |
|
PACIFIC ISLANDS REPORT Pacific Islands Development Program/East-West Center |
||
|
The Contemporary Pacific Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2010 Vanuatu As 2010 got underway, the issue of the status of the Speaker of Parliament, Maxime Carlot Korman, held over from last year, remained to be dealt with. In late November 2009, the Vanua‘aku Pati (vp) prime minister, Edward Natapei, had removed two parties from the governing coalition—the National United Party (nup) led by Ham Lini, and the Vanuatu Republican Party (vrp) led by Korman. Natapei replaced them with the Alliance Group and its fifteen associated members of Parliament, led by Sato Kilman from the island of Malakula, leader of the People’s Progressive Party (ppp), who was made deputy prime minister (vdp, 20 Nov 2009). The position of the Union of Moderate Parties (ump) within the coalition, led by Serge Vohor, was strengthened in the reshuffle with the allocation of two additional ministerial portfolios. In a move most likely aimed at protecting his position as Speaker, Korman declared late November that the prime minister had lost his seat because he had not obtained permission to be absent from Parliament. Natapei had left Vanuatu in November to attend an overseas meeting, which coincided with the last session of Parliament. Natapei protested that he had let the Speaker know and, on his return, had obtained a Supreme Court ruling that the Speaker’s decision was unconstitutional (vdp, 7 Dec 2009). However, Natapei found that he was also facing a no-confidence motion tabled by Ham Lini, the new leader of the Opposition. The government had hoped to remove the Speaker at the same time as Parliament voted on the motion of no confidence, which was easily defeated, but Korman was able to manipulate standing orders to avoid a vote on his own position. He remained as Speaker until January 2010, when the government called an extraordinary session of Parliament with the intention of removing him. However, rather than being voted out, he resigned. In the election that followed, the government’s nominee for Speaker, Luganville mp George Wells (nup), defeated Korman, the Opposition’s nominee, in a secret ballot by thirty-two votes to nineteen (vdp, 3 o Jan 2010), Resolution of the issue of the Speaker concluded the process of restructuring the government coalition that had begun toward the end of November 2009, but, as the motion of no confidence indicated, the political [End Page 511] situation was not settled. At the time of the November reshuffle, Natapei also used the opportunity to remove renegade Tanna mp Harry Iauko (vp), who held the position of minister of lands (vdp, 18 Nov 2009). Iauko had been accused of corruption over land dealings and suspended as a member of the Vanua‘aku Pati since 2008 when he decided to support a no-confidence motion against Natapei. The vote for the new Speaker was significant, as it indicated that six members of Parliament from the government had joined the Opposition and voted for Korman. The Natapeiled government had a total of thirty-nine members, compared to thirteen in the Opposition. It emerged that the six government members who voted for the Opposition nominee were led by mp Harry Iauko and included two other vp members plus three independents (Independent, 30 Jan–5 Feb 2010). The Vanua‘aku Pati’s problem with Harry Iauko goes back over a decade to when he became an active member of the party on his home island of Tanna. He identified himself with those who called for the main parties to open opportunities for younger members—something that established party leaders were usually prepared to support in principle but found difficult to put into practice. Iauko and his supporters were instrumental in electing Natapei president at the vp’s 1999 Ipota Congress on Erromango, defeating Donald Kalpokas, who was one of the founding fathers and vp president. This proved to be extremely divisive. The Natapei/Iauko faction targeted Kalpokas in the 2004 election, causing him to lose his seat. Since that time, however, the old vp stalwarts have gradually united around Natapei, leaving Iauko frustrated and vengeful. Indeed, Natapei and Iauko no longer have the close political relationship they once had. Iauko’s ambition finally led him to run for Parliament in the 2008 election when he succeeded in securing the highest number of votes of any candidate on Tanna, which saw the Vanua‘aku Pati gain four of the seven seats in the constituency. Following this result, Iauko clearly expected a ministerial portfolio in the new vp-led coalition government, which also included nup with Ham Lini as deputy prime minister. However, this did not happen. As usual, the new prime minister, Edward Natapei, faced the difficult task of balancing the thirteen available portfolios among coalition partners and regions/islands within the country. Iauko was not happy to have been denied a portfolio and was even more incensed ten days later when he was again ignored in another reshuffle, which brought Serge Vohor and his ump members into the coalition in order to avoid defeat in a vote of no confidence. Iauko’s response was to lead another vote of no confidence, which also failed. Finally, in June 2009, Iauko got his chance during another reshuffle and was made minister of lands, despite the fact that he was still under suspension from the Vanua‘aku Pati (vdp, 16 June 2009). However, as noted earlier, after only five months, as part of the reshuffle in late November 2009, Natapei decided to take the opportunity to remove Iauko as minister of lands. By this time, Iauko had clearly [End Page 512] decided that the only way to achieve recognition by the Vanua‘aku Pati was to challenge the leadership of the party itself. During 2009 he traveled around the country seeking support among vp members by organizing subcommittees to back him in an attempt to take over as party president at the next vp congress, which was scheduled for 2009. According to the vp constitution, congresses should take place once a year. However, the party executive, of which he was not a member, did not hold a congress in 2008 and postponed that of 2009 until 2010. In response, Iauko’s supporters organized a petition among vp members in an attempt to force an early meeting in January 2010, but the party executive preferred May or June. At the same time, Natapei, as vp president, issued warning letters to members of the party who had pledged their support for the petition, accusing them of colluding with a suspended member to destabilize the party and threatening them and their subcommittees with suspension. When political parties are unable to solve internal disputes (a common occurrence in Vanuatu), they refer them to the courts. This is what happened with the case of the vp, resulting in a court order requiring Vanua‘aku Pati to hold its congress on 1 April 2010 at Lumbukuti on the island of Tongoa in the Shepherd Group (vdp, 6, 21 22, 23 Jan 2010; 6 Feb 2010). During the congress, the party executive planned to introduce a number of changes to the vp constitution, but the biggest issue to be dealt with was the election of a new executive. Harry Iauko made no secret of the fact that he intended to challenge Edward Natapei for the position of president and hoped to be able to replace the entire executive with his own supporters. He claimed to have 300 subcommittees pledged to him, but whether they were registered according to party procedures with valid signatures was in dispute (vdp, 10 Feb 2010). One week before the vp congress, Natapei announced that no new subcommittees would be allowed at the Tongoa congress unless they had been approved at the last one in 2007. According to vp procedures, all new subcommittees had to be verified according to specific criteria. Since this had not been done with regard to those supporting Iauko, his support base was effectively denied permission to participate (vdp, 24 March 2010). Nevertheless, Iauko moved on, chartering a plane and a boat to transport his subcommittees to Tongoa (vdp, 25 March 2010). Not surprisingly, the opening of the congress at Lumbukuti village was delayed due to disputes over which subcommittees should be registered. There was potential for violence between the opposing groups, and Natapei and the executive, through their lawyer in Port Vila, obtained two court injunctions in an attempt to restrain Iauko and his supporters. Consequently, Natapei and his executive decided to move the congress to the nearby village of Panita. Iauko, however, proceeded to organize the election of a new executive at Lumbukuti. He was elected president, Tongoa mp Willie Ruben Abel vice president, and Natapei (in his absence) secretary-general—Iauko obviously believing that he could continue to use Natapei to divide the party to his advantage. [End Page 513] Natapei and the existing party executive, however, continued with what they claimed was the official congress at Panita. The result was, and still is, that two individuals now claim to he vp president, Natapei arguing that the Lumbukuti congress was illegal and that the results of the Panita congress reflected the legitimate wishes of the party (vdp, 7 April 2010; Independent, 17–23 April 2010). With Iauko adamant that he represented the legitimate Vanua‘aku Pati, of which he was the true leader, the Natapei faction again turned to the Supreme Court to resolve the impasse. Having been expelled from the party by the Panita congress, Iauko and Abel joined the Opposition in Parliament, Iauko becoming its deputy leader while still claiming to represent the Vanua‘aku Pati (vdp, 19 May 2010). Owing to the confusion within the vp, the Speaker of Parliament required all members to declare their party affiliation. This revealed that in June, government numbers remained intact at 34: Vanua‘aku Pati (Natapei group) 9, Union of Moderate Parties 8, and the Alliance Group 17 (including members from the People’s Progressive Party, Green Confederation, Namangie Aute, Vanuatu Progressive Republican Farmer Party, Shepherds Alliance, Vanuatu National Party, People’s Action Party, and independents, including Ralph Regenvanu). Opposition numbers totaled 18: Vanuatu Republican Party 8, National United Party 5, Vanua‘aku Pati (Iauko group) 2, Labour Party 2, and Nagriamel 1 (vdp, 1 June 2010). It took well over a month for the Natapei group to submit to the Supreme Court documentation challenging Iauko’s claim. The application asked the court to declare null and void the meeting held by the “Iauko faction” and the elections of Iauko as president and the other members of the executive; most importantly, they sought a ruling that the defendants not be allowed to use the name Vanua‘aku Pati (vdp, 21 May 2010). At the end of the year, the court had yet to deliver a judgment, apparently due to the slowness of the vp executive in submitting the application papers and following up on procedures. As a result, the Vanua‘aku Pati—the party of independence and the current senior member of the governing coalition—began to appear weak and disengaged. Indeed, Opposition leader Ham Lini complained at the end of April that the government had still not set a date for the first ordinary sitting of Parliament, which, under standing orders, was required to be held by the middle of May at the latest (vdp, 30 April 2010). In contrast, the other parties, both within government and the Opposition, used the opportunity to present themselves as far as possible in a positive light. Various meetings and congresses took place, often reported as preparation for the next election, despite the fact that it was not due to be held until September 2012. In May, the Union of Moderate Parties (ump), the oldest francophone party, held its congress on the island of Pentecost. Serge Vohor, who was reelected ump president unopposed, boasted about the party’s achievements over the years and promised to review government land policies, which dated back to independence and were causing many Ni-Vanuatu to lose their land. In a [End Page 514] fascinating turnaround, Vohor claimed that ump had been the first party to take the issue of independence to the United Nations. This is impossible as ump was not founded until 1983, when a number of francophone parties that had resisted independence united to form a single party. Repeating a promise he had made in 2008, when ump was brought into the governing coalition, Vohor pledged continued loyalty to the Natapei-led government until the next election (Independent, 29 May–4 June 2010). The political group that had, in fact, first raised the issue of independence before the United Nations was Nagriamel (formerly a “movement” led by the infamous Jimmy Stevens from the island of Santo), which became heavily involved in the 1980 secessionist rebellion against the future independent Republic of Vanuatu. Nagriamel somehow survived the arrest and imprisonment of many of its leaders—Jimmy Stevens, now deceased, had been sentenced to fourteen years for his involvement—and has emerged as one of the small parties that regularly field candidates in national elections and occasionally win seats in areas where they were strong historically. Nagriamel succeeded in winning one seat in the 2008 election on the island of Malo. At its congress in May, the party members elected a full executive, but surprisingly, none of the office bearers were from the Stevens family, although Jimmy Stevens had numerous children, two of whom, Franky and Yakato, have been involved in politics since his death (vdp, 15 May 2010). It remains to be seen if this marks the beginning of the transformation of Nagriamel from what some considered a cult movement, solely identified with its founder Jimmy Stevens, to a more modern political organization. The People’s Progressive Party, which won four seats in the 2008 election, made news during 2010 by announcing its increased support on various islands, and the party’s leader, Sato Kilman, became president of the Alliance Group and deputy prime minister within the coalition (vdp, 18 June 2010). At the party congress in September, Kilman was reelected as president and pledged continued allegiance to the Natapei-led coalition government (vdp, 9 Sept 2010). On the Opposition side, the National United Party held its congress in September and reelected Ham Lini unopposed as president, though it was said there were two groups lobbying for the position during the lead-up to the congress. As this is the party of Lini’s now deceased brother, Father Walter Lini, it is hard to imagine someone other than a member of the Lini family as nup leader. Indeed, Ham Lini was elected unopposed to replace his brother in the 1999 by-election. During 2010, from time to time he traded places with Maxime Carlot Gorman (vrp) as leader of the Opposition. In November 2009, as noted earlier, Natapei had removed the National United Party from the government for failing to discipline some of its members for serious allegations of corruption. As a result of Lini’s poor handling of nup affairs, several dissatisfied members of Parliament had withdrawn to join other parties, 2 to the Alliance Group and 1 each to the Vanua‘aku Pati and the Vanuatu Republican Party. As a [End Page 515] result, only 3 nup members remained in Parliament. It is not clear why the other major political party, the Vanuatu Republican Party, did not meet officially during 2010, though the decision by two members to side with the government rather than with Korman in a coalition reshuffle later in the year would indicate some division within party ranks. Korman, therefore, may have been reluctant to call a congress, but he remained party president. A development that surprisingly warranted only a back-page report in the Daily Post was the establishment in early November of a new political party, the Graon mo Jastis Party (Land and Justice Party), by popular independent Port Vila mp Ralph Regenvanu (vdp, 11 Nov 2010). In the 2008 election Regenvanu received the highest number of votes in the history of elections in Vanuatu, campaigning against government corruption and failure to prosecute cases of official breaches of the law, the poor performance of government generally in providing services to the public, and the loss of land rights through a poorly structured leasing policy in the face of increasing land speculation by foreign investors. These are all issues that Regenvanu actively continued to promote during 2010. Looking toward the 2012 election, Regenvanu announced that he would be seeking suitable candidates in the islands to run under the Graon mo Jastis Party in the hope of entering Parliament with a block of new members, large enough to have an influence on coalition formation and government policy generally. It will be a challenge to find good people, committed to Regenvanu’s goals and with the strength to resist pressure from other parties and politicians to sell out in return for special favors (vdp, 15 Nov 2010). During 2010, community frustration remained high over the continued inability (or unwillingness) of the government to deal with pressing problems and alleged illegal activities by politicians and government officials, some of which date back several years. The weekly Vanuatu Independent resumed publication of a list of “Answers Still Urgently Needed from Government,” many relating to issues regularly raised by Transparency Vanuatu in its column published in the Daily Post. Of particular concern was the inaction of government to respond to public demand for an amendment to the Ombudsman’s Act, giving the ombudsman power to prosecute people following the publication of reports (Independent, 20–26 Feb 2010). The mistreatment of prisoners continued to be of considerable concern in 2010 following the major breakout from the Vila prison in late 2008, and the arrest of mps Ralph Regenvanu and Moana Carcasses, who had attempted to provide some protection against feared police reprisals. Both had their cases dropped. The community was shocked by the prison escape, but even more by the assault of Marc Neil-Jones, the publisher of the Daily Post, by members of the Correctional Services, following his publication of a strongly worded editorial calling for the then acting director of the Correctional Services, Joshua Bong, to step down. To this day, the officers involved have not been brought to [End Page 516] justice, while Bong was subsequently appointed commissioner of police. Related to this incident is the even more serious unresolved case of a young man from the island of Ambae by the name of James Bule, who was arrested for an offense, joined the major breakout from prison, was re-apprehended, and then died in custody on 29 March 2009 from severe injuries to his body while in the hands of members of the Vanuatu Military Force (vmf). After much delay, caused by the difficulty in procuring the required documentation from the vmf, in March 2011 the coroner, Nevin Dawson (a Supreme Court judge seconded from New Zealand), presented a scathing report of the evidence given at the inquest. Dawson stated that the vmf, from the top brass to the lower-ranked officers, appeared to have contrived their reports, indicating a predetermined plan of what would be told to the inquest and what would be withheld. Commissioner Bong, it was reported, had to be recalled twice for failure to produce a number of required documents, including a duty roster for the night in question, which appeared to be at least partially a fabrication. Dawson was appalled by what he described as extraordinarily obstructive behavior by the country’s leading law enforcement officer (vdp, 6 March 2010). Dawson also said in his report that the vmf had breached Vanuatu’s constitution, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, and the rule of law. He called for homicide and assault investigations into Bule’s death, perjury inquiries into the evidence given by Vanuatu’s police commissioner, and radical changes to police systems. In addition to the attempts made to undermine the inquiry, Judge Dawson revealed that a senior vmf officer had issued a death threat against him in the presence of numerous witnesses, and rifle-waving vmf officers had made shows of force near the courtroom. New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs Murray McCully expressed his government’s concern regarding the threats and police brutality, which he said could adversely affect continued aid to Vanuatu. McCully also intended to consult with his Australian counterpart, given that targeted assistance to the vmf was a major Australian aid project (vdp, 15 March 2010). The Government of Vanuatu’s response, delivered by the Acting Minister for Internal Affairs Sato Kilman, stressed the government’s commitment to the rule of law and emphasized the special conditions under which the vmf were acting at the time of the incident—protecting the community from dangerous escaped prisoners. In Kilman’s view, the main purpose of the coroner’s report was to raise awareness of measures that need to be taken to ensure that such incidents do not occur in future, for example, preparing proper interrogation procedures and facilities, introducing new legislation that addresses the functions of the vmf in relation to internal security, and so forth. Nowhere in the announcement printed in the Daily Post did Kilman address the issue of instituting proper investigations into the allegations made by Judge Dawson in his report (vdp, 1 April 2010). It is significant to note that as the year ended, no [End Page 517] criminal charges had been laid by the public prosecutor against any of the individuals named in the report. The role of Vanuatu uniformed officials in guaranteeing public safety continues to be a serious problem. The media became an issue in Vanuatu during 2010 with Transparency Vanuatu, which contributes regularly to the Daily Post, publishing an article in May on the issue of media freedom and freedom of information in Vanuatu. Transparency Vanuatu pointed out that the government had dominant control over the flow of news, seldom holding news conferences and only reacting to events under concerted pressure from the media and the public, usually in cursory responses to radio talk-back shows and letters to the editor. Moreover, the government operates the only local television station and, while Vanuatu enjoys three regularly published newspapers (one daily and two weeklies), there is limited analysis of the news due to a dearth of investigative journalism. According to Transparency Vanuatu, this journalistic reticence can be explained by the government’s history of threats and intimidation. A British journalist was deported in 1983 (MacClancy 1984, 109); the editor of the government media services was dismissed in 1991 for his refusal to cease publishing political news (Van Trease 1995, 112–113); and the current publisher of the Daily Post, Marc Neil-Jones, was also deported, although the order was successfully overturned following a court appeal. As noted earlier, Neil-Jones was also physically assaulted in 2009 in his office following an editorial he wrote describing the deficiencies in the Correctional Services that resulted in the prison breakout and death in custody of the recaptured prisoner, James Bule (vdp, 7 May 2010). In addition, debate over media ownership in Vanuatu surfaced as a hot issue, at least in the media, when Neil-Jones submitted an application for a broadcasting license. The Media Asosiesen Blong Vanuatu (Media Association of Vanuatu) opposed the application on the grounds that the media industry should be included in the reserve list of businesses that are restricted to indigenous Ni-Vanuatu. A pro-indigenous media article appeared in the weekly Vanuatu Times (whose director coincidentally also operates an fm radio station), arguing that indigenous people are being disadvantaged because foreigners are allowed to invest in Vanuatu. Furthermore, the Vanuatu Times owner accused Neil-Jones of violating the media code of ethics and abusing media freedom by “using the newspaper to cause problems in society”—an obvious reference to his hard-hitting reporting. Neil-Jones responded, in a letter to the Vanuatu Times, that he had lived in Vanuatu for seventeen years and was a naturalized citizen and therefore entitled under the constitution to the same treatment and benefits as any indigenous Ni-Vanuatu. However, the Vanuatu Times refused to publish the letter and Neil-Jones ended up printing it in his own Daily Post (vdp, 26 Oct 2010). The acting prime minister, when asked his opinion on the issue, replied that media ownership should be open to all citizens of Vanuatu (vdp, 21 Oct 2010). One outraged reader wrote to the Daily Post, defending freedom of the press and condemning the call [End Page 518] for the government to implement a media policy “folem colour blo skin emi [according to skin color] as pure racism, period!” (vdp, 3 Nov 2010). Several foreign policy issues also had a significant impact on local politics during 2010. One in particular, a dispute between Vanuatu and France over the ownership of two uninhabited volcanic islands to the extreme south of the group, Matthew and Hunter, aroused considerable public interest and seemed to unite opposing political factions. The problem predates independence, when Vanuatu’s two former colonial powers, Great Britain and France, failed to deal with the issue. Matthew and Hunter became a diplomatic problem in 2010 when the Government of Vanuatu submitted a bill to Parliament for the Maritime Zone Act, spelling out Vanuatu’s territorial rights and including the two disputed islands within the country’s boundary. Vanuatu’s claim is based on custom and the legendary god Majikijiki, who arrived in the southern islands via Umaeneag (Hunter) and Umaenupne (Matthew) in the distant past, and the fact that these islands geologically form part of the Vanuatu island chain, separated from New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands by the continental shelf and the New Hebrides Trench. Taking advantage of the lack of formal documentation during the days of the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides, and ignoring a Kanak liberation movement pronouncement that the indigenous people of New Caledonia had no claim on the two southern islands, the French government decided to insist more vigorously on its claim to sovereignty and became particularly concerned when the Vanuatu government submitted the bill to Parliament (Makin 2010). In January there was a political complication when it was reported that Minister of Internal Affairs Moana Carcasses (the only naturalized citizen in Parliament, a Francophone and the leader of the Greens in the Alliance Group) had on a visit to New Caledonia allegedly told French officials that the majority of the population of the southern islands of Vanuatu did not agree with the government’s stance on Matthew and Hunter (vdp, 20 Jan 2010). Prime Minister Natapei came under pressure to discipline his minister but refused to do so, claiming that the incident was based merely on speculation (vdp, 30 Jan 2010). Several months later, however, it was reported and confirmed by Carcasses himself that the French ambassador to Vanuatu had paid him a visit to express France’s concern about the bill. Ham Lini, the leader of the Opposition, accused France of “interference in the internal affairs of the nation” and alleged that the ambassador had threatened the possibility of France “withdrawing its aid assistance to Vanuatu” if the bill were passed—this being the reason, he said, for the government’s decision to temporarily withdraw the bill from debate. At the same time, Lini accused the Natapei government of being divided on the matter of how to deal with the French threat (vdp, 7 June 2010). The ambassador denied the accusation of interference, stating that “the French authorities wish this question to be discussed with the same friendly spirit that presides over all Vanuatu and France relations,” noting the various ways in which Vanuatu benefited [End Page 519] from its cooperation with France. The acting leader of the Opposition at this time, Harry Iauko, strongly criticized the Natapei-led government for allowing the French government to use aid money to buy influence in Vanuatu and implied that if the late Father Walter Lini and Barak Sope (who was first secretary to the government in the early 1980s) were still in power, the ambassador would probably be deported for political interference (vdp, 8 June 2010). It is interesting to note that in criticizing Natapei, Iauko (one of the so-called young politicians) had become the champion of traditional Vanua‘aku Pati positions, replacing the old guard. Over the next few days, the president of the Malvatumauri (the National Council of Chiefs), individual chiefs from Tanna, and a former president, Jean-Marie Léyé from Aneityum (the island closest to Matthew and Hunter) spoke out against the French claim to the islands (vdp, 11 June, 16 June 2010). In addition, several articles and letters to the editor also appeared in the local press condemning the French position and the attitude of some Francophones—in effect, questioning their loyalty to Vanuatu (vdp, 12 June 2010). Likewise, a surprisingly confrontational letter appeared in the Daily Post from “A worried Indigenous Citizen” raising the issue of the French ambassador’s visit to Minister Carcasses. It pointed out that the minister was a Francophone and nonindigenous—a matter seldom raised in public and indicating that the old Anglophone/Francophone divide is still a factor in politics and, indeed, an especially potent one when the issue of France’s attitude toward Vanuatu is in question (vdp, 10 June 2010). The bill was reintroduced and a vote took place on 17 June amid much confusion. A group of chiefs from the southern island of Tanna who had gathered to ensure that the bill was debated were excluded from Parliament by the Speaker, who feared disruptive behavior. The bill passed, but without the Opposition, who claimed to support it but then refused to vote because of the Speaker’s decision to exclude the Tanna chiefs (vdp, 19 June 2010). Passage of the Maritime Zone Act did nothing to end the dispute between Vanuatu and France, and the issue resurfaced in November, when rumors circulated in the community that a secret government plan to send the country’s naval patrol boat, Tukoro, to visit the islands had been intercepted by French intelligence in Noumea. It was reported, though she denied it, that the French ambassador visited the Tukoro to discourage the undertaking of the trip. Indeed, it transpired that the ambassador had instead actually gone to the Office of Maritime Surveillance and the commissioner of police—in itself, a shockingly confrontational and undiplomatic act. Nevertheless, the ambassador’s action raised concerns in some quarters, and the revelation that the French government was spying on the sovereign state of Vanuatu evoked the headline in the Daily Post: “France Bullies Vanuatu over Matthew, Hunter” (vdp, 28 Oct, 30 Oct 2010). Barak Sope noted in an interview with the Daily Post that in 1983 he had been instrumental in deporting a French ambassador for interference in government matters [End Page 520] and suggested that the current ambassador should have raised the issue with the minister of foreign affairs (vdp, 4 Nov 2010). Probably in order to demonstrate his determination to proceed with Vanuatu’s claim and counter any impression that he was less than strong on the issue, Natapei announced that the government and the Malvatumauri would be staging a public march in support of Vanuatu’s claim over Matthew and Hunter, appealed to France to relinquish its claim, and noted that Vanuatu would be proceeding with its claim at the United Nations (vdp, 24 Nov, 29 Nov 2010). Vanuatu’s relations with France are, of course, much more complicated than simply disputing the sovereignty of a couple of uninhabited islands. Nowadays the French government promotes the idea, and would like to believe, that France has become an accepted member of the larger Pacific community, having cast off its pariah status caused by the attack by French government agents in 1985 on the Greenpeace vessel, the Rainbow Warrior (which resulted in the death of a member of the crew); the massacre of nineteen pro-independence Kanaks on Ouvéa, New Caledonia, in 1988; and its program of nuclear testing in French Polynesia, which had only ceased in 1996. The French government’s long-term objective, which it has followed for almost fifty years, is to be able to remain permanently in the Pacific. Over the last two decades it has dispensed aid and assistance to Pacific Island countries (such as surveillance of fishing grounds and support during natural disasters), which must certainly be appreciated. It is obvious, however, that the aim of this policy is to mask France’s real strategy—professing to support independence but in reality simply refusing to adopt policies designed to give genuine recognition to the aspirations of the indigenous populations of their colonies. This is the strategy they followed unsuccessfully in the case of Vanuatu in the 1960s and 70s, which aimed to prevent independence and gave support to the secessionist rebellion against the democratically elected government of Father Walter Lini (Van Trease 1995, 3—58). Of their three colonies—French Polynesia, Wallis/Futuna, and New Caledonia—the latter has been the most problematic for the French government. The Vanuatu government gave strong support to the Kanak independence movement, the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak Socialiste (flnks) in the 1980s, and in 1986 the Vanuatu government sponsored New Caledonia for reinscription to the United Nations Committee of 24 on Decolonization. Vanuatu was also instrumental in getting agreement for the inclusion of the flnks as a member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, founded in 1988. With the split in the Vanua‘aku Pati in 1991 and the subsequent election of a Korman-led ump government, relations between Vanuatu and France took a different turn. Korman reversed the former vp government’s unequivocal support for the flnks and obvious enmity toward France. Francophones held power, under Maxime Carlot Korman or Serge Vohor, until 1998, and are often in coalition with anglophone parties as in 2010. Maintaining and [End Page 521] strengthening this political divide through targeted aid designed to strengthen Francophonie is a priority for the French government today to insure that Vanuatu follows a more moderate public position with regard to continued French colonialism in the Pacific. For example, the French government has committed itself to supporting a new ump language policy proposed in 2009, under which all children from class 1 through 8 would be educated predominately in French; for the small percentage of students who go on to high school in subsequent years, English would be the medium of instruction for those who chose it (see Van Trease 2009, 475). In early June 2010, Prime Minister Natapei led a four-day fact-finding Melanesian Spearhead Group (msg) mission to New Caledonia, at the request of the flnks, to assess the progress of the 1998 Noumea Accord and to determine ways that the msg could assist. The report was to be tabled at the Pacific Islands Forum meeting scheduled to take place in Port Vila in August. The aim of the accord is to progressively transfer power to New Caledonian authorities until the territory decides, in a referendum to be held between 2014 and 2019, whether to remain within the French Republic or to become an independent state. The prime minister reported that the mission was concerned about the slow rate of progress in the implementation of the accord and, in particular, the continued existence of significant social and economic imbalances between the indigenous Kanak population and other groups—evidence that the genuine aspirations of the indigenous Kanak people are not being met (vdp, 4 June, 12 June 2010). It is not clear exactly when the msg report was discussed at the Forum, but it had obvious negative repercussions for the French. The governments of both New Caledonia and French Polynesia had requested that their participation at the Forum be upgraded from the level of associate status, that is, that they be able to take part in the leaders’ retreat, which is reserved for heads of state and government of the member countries. This was not agreed to and in the final Forum communiqué, with specific reference to New Caledonia, the point was made that the territory would have to “continue their dialogue with France in order to be able to satisfy the full membership” (pif 2010). Given past history, it is relevant to contemplate what the position of the Vanuatu government would have been on the issue of New Caledonia at this time had the prime minister been a Francophone. During 2010, the Opposition regularly accused the Natapei government of being weak on issues relating to foreign affairs. In fact, what may have appeared at times to be hesitation or wavering could more appropriately be described simply as the practice of cautious diplomacy. Of all the political parties, the Vanua‘aku Pati had the most knowledgeable and experienced team, headed by Joe Natuman, a university-educated minister of foreign affairs who had held various other portfolios, and Prime Minister Natapei’s private secretary, Nikenike Vurobaravu, who holds a master’s degree in international affairs from the University of London and worked [End Page 522] for the Forum for a number of years during the 1990s. The cautious nature of the government’s diplomacy became especially clear with regard to the West Papua issue, which flared up in early 2010, remained in the public debate until the end of the year, and significantly impacted the stability of the coalition government. In February, the Vanuatu Free West Papua Association (vfwpa) planned to hold a peaceful march in Port Vila to raise awareness of West Papua in anticipation of the meetings of the Pacific Islands Forum and Melanesian Spearhead Group later in the year. The intention was to hold the march on Lini Day (a public holiday in commemoration of the country’s first prime minister) in recognition of Father Lini’s famous statement, “So long as any Pacific Islands remain colonized, none of us is free.” Since the Vanua‘aku Pati had facilitated the founding of the vfwpa in the 1980s, it came as a surprise to many that the Natapei government refused to allow the march to go ahead. The headline in the Daily Post the next day read: “Government Takes U-turn over West Papua.” In response, a government official pointed out that since Vanuatu had formal diplomatic relations with Indonesia, it had in effect accepted Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua. Vanuatu had the right to express concerns about human rights violations and other issues, but questioning the sovereignty of West Papua would be interpreted as interfering in the internal affairs of Indonesia (vdp, 18 Feb, 25 Feb 2010). But within a few days, the government reversed its decision and approved a march, which took place on Chief’s Day, 5 March 2010, when Minister of Foreign Affairs Joe Natuman accepted a petition from more than 200 West Papua sympathizers, including the president of the Malvatumauri, two former prime ministers, Opposition leader Ham Lini, and many community leaders who had links to the period of Vanuatu’s struggle for independence. The way in which the petition was presented was important. The marchers first presented the petition and a large pig to the president of the Malvatumauri, which he accepted. He then presented the petition and a different pig with full circular tusks to the minister of foreign affairs. The circular-tusked pig symbolized the high level of respect that the president of Malvatumauri was requesting from the government in its consideration of the petition. In a letter to the Daily Post, a representative of the Malvatumauri explained that “the petition was being presented with the value of custom attached to it requiring that it be honored, if accepted and subsequently received by the recipient, rather than the government receiving a piece of paper with demands” (vdp, 9 March 2010). Minister Natuman noted in a short speech that Vanuatu would “never forget its history and where we have come from. And decolonization has and will be the cornerstone of our foreign policy.” He also made the point that Vanuatu still supported West Papua, despite having diplomatic relations with Indonesia, and made mention of the fact that it had not been under a Vanua‘aku Pati–led government that diplomatic relations had been established but in the 1990s when the Union of Moderate [End Page 523] Parties had control of the government under the leadership of Maxime Carlot Korman and Serge Vohor (vdp, 6 March 2010). Rumors circulating two months later that the minister had been invited to talks in Jakarta elicited strong condemnation from the Opposition’s Ham Lini. He reminded the government of Vanuatu’s own colonial history and the support that the then New Hebrides had received, enabling the country to be enlisted with the UN Committee of 24 for Decolonization, which eventually led to independence (vdp, 4 May 2010). By June it appeared that both government and opposition had agreed on a common policy. It was agreed that Prime Minister Natapei should lodge a motion with the UN secretary-general on behalf of Vanuatu for the inclusion of a debate on the status of West Papua on the agenda of the 2010 session of the General Assembly. A motion to this effect, known as the Wantok Blong Yumi Bill (Our Common Peoples’ Bill), was tabled in Parliament by independent mp Ralph Regenvanu, moved by the prime minister, seconded by the then Leader of the Opposition Maxime Carlot Korman, and passed unanimously. Included was an appeal for the General Assembly to ask the International Court of Justice to provide an advisory opinion on the process by which the Netherlands had ceded West Papua to Indonesia in 1962 and the conduct or effect of the 1969 Act of Free Choice (vdp, 21 June 2010). On a visit to the United Kingdom, Regenvanu canvassed parliamentarians for support of the Vanuatu motion in the United Nations and reported that he had been received favorably (vdp, 5 July 2010). When the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the Pacific Islands Forum met in August, a group of six West Papuans traveled to Vanuatu to present requests in support of their cause (vdp, 4 Aug 2010). However, PNG Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare objected to discussing West Papua at the Forum and it was eventually learned that the issue had not been included on the agenda (vdp, 6 Aug, 7 Aug 2010). The effect was to undermine the position of the Natapei government. To the public, it appeared that the prime minister had not lobbied hard enough for the West Papua cause. When it was reported that Indonesia had donated new uniforms to Vanuatu for the police force and that the government had entertained a high-level Indonesian official, the political ramifications increased. A government member of Parliament, David Abel (and there may have been others) announced that he was having discussions with the Opposition about a possible change of sides (vdp, 9 Aug 2010). Foreign Minister Natuman replied that Vanuatu was unable to achieve its goal with regard to the Forum because it needed full msg support and that had not been forthcoming due to the position of Papua New Guinea (vdp, 11 Aug 2010). Complicating the matter further was the government decision (which had not been communicated to the public beforehand) that the prime minister would not mention West Papua in his speech at the United Nations in October. Instead, Natapei urged UN members to address issues of colonialism, making a clear reference to the difficulty that Vanuatu was experiencing [End Page 524] with France over Matthew and Hunter (Maclellan 2010). Natapei’s failure to champion the West Papua cause was unforgivable and the reaction was explosive. The frontpage headline in the Daily Post read: “Natapei Fails Promise in Parliament on W-Papua,” noting that he had not followed the mandate Parliament had given him in the Wantok Blong Yumi Bill to speak out for West Papuan decolonization (vdp, 15 Oct 2010). Succumbing to diplomatic pressures and their view of what was possible given Vanuatu’s formal international commitments, Natapei and his government appeared to be weak. The leader of the Opposition wrote to the Speaker requesting that Parliament be called on 25 October to debate a motion of no confidence in Prime Minister Natapei. Among the reasons given was the failure of the prime minister to follow Parliament’s motion to present the issue of West Papua to the United Nations (vdp, 15 Oct 2010). A few days later, amid claims by various members of Parliament that they felt they were being manipulated, with signatures being added and withdrawn from the motion, the Opposition found it did not have the numbers to proceed and so the attempt to unseat Natapei collapsed (vdp, 20 Oct 2010). The third major diplomatic issue facing the Natapei government during 2010 was the problem of Fiji’s position in the Melanesian Spearhead Group. It had been four years since Commodore Frank Bainimarama led a coup that overthrew Fiji’s democratically elected government. Due to his unwillingness to commit to a return to democracy by scheduling new elections, the Pacific Islands Forum had suspended Fiji, but the msg decided to continue to engage with Bainimarama, hoping that he could be convinced to compromise on his position. Despite several face-to-face meetings with the commander, Natapei, as msg chairman during 2009 and 2010, failed to change Bainimarama’s mind. The looming problem for Natapei was that Vanuatu was due to hand over the msg chairmanship to Fiji at a meeting in Suva in July. This meant that Natapei would have to hand over the leadership of the organization to an unelected leader, which Natapei felt obliged to take action to prevent, given that underlying the msg is the fundamental principle of democracy, which all members are committed to practice. In view of the impasse with Bainimarama, Natapei consulted with the other msg leaders (Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and the flnks) and it was agreed (though there is some debate as to how united they were on the decision) that the Suva meeting should be postponed (vdp, 13 July 2010). Bainimarama responded only hours after the announcement by accusing Natapei of bowing to the wishes of the Australians and by expelling the Australian ambassador in Suva, who he claimed was trying to persuade other regional diplomats in Fiji not to attend the msg meeting. The Daily Post printed stories that the Australian government had been promising financial aid and other benefits to msg members in an effort to achieve the postponement of the meeting (vdp, 14 July 2010). Leader of the Opposition Maxime Carlot Korman reacted strongly against Natapei’s decision in [End Page 525] an interview, saying that he could see no reason for the delay and that the result “has destroyed the trust and confidence that Fiji has had in Vanuatu’s neutral position in dealing with Fiji’s situation” (vdp, 17 July 2010). The Vanuatu government’s position looked even weaker when, a week later, Bainimarama was able to convince the heads of government from Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu and the ambassadors or representatives of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Timor-Leste, and Tonga to attend an “Engaging Fiji” meeting in place of the postponed msg leaders’ summit. Korman’s response was to call for Natapei to resign (vdp, 23 July 2010). The government did, however, receive positive acknowledgement for its stand from Transparency Vanuatu, which commended Natapei for “his courageous stand in upholding the core principles of democracy despite the mounting pressure from and within the region” (vdp, 6 Aug 2010). Subsequent events, however, would indicate that such principles are not widely held by many of Vanuatu’s political leaders, nor, it would seem, by many in the region. While creating significant public debate among the small percentage of the public who read newspapers (something not to be overlooked generally when trying to understand or gauge Ni-Vanuatu views of political developments), the call for the government’s resignation received no support. Indeed, despite the earlier challenge to his leadership of the Vanua‘aku Pati by Harry Iauko, Natapei had been able to hold the coalition (the vp, ump, and the Alliance Group) together quite successfully, with the National United Party and the Vanuatu Republican Party in opposition. Nevertheless, the vp problem remained unresolved, and with Iauko in the Opposition and determined to topple the party leadership, it was certain that he would try to destabilize the coalition whenever an opportunity presented itself. Earlier, in May, a rumor had begun to circulate that a motion of no confidence was being considered among the backbenchers, but nothing came of it (vdp, 14 May 2010). Likewise, in September, as the msg issue began to fade, dissatisfaction within the Alliance Group regarding the division of portfolios was leading some members of Parliament to threaten to move to the Opposition. The problem appeared to be limited to the People’s Progressive Party (probably encouraged by Iauko), but Sato Kilman was reelected at the party congress and the disquiet subsided (vdp, 4 Sept, 9 Sept 2010). At the same time, one of the six Port Vila mps who had affiliated with the Alliance Group, David Abel of the Shepherd Alliance, threatened to switch to the Opposition over the government’s handling of the West Papua issue (vdp, 8 Sept 2010). This was one of Iauko’s main criticisms as well, which prompted the Opposition, as noted earlier, to attempt a motion of no confidence in late October, though this also failed to get enough signatures. In late October, in a sign of support for the government, ump leader Serge Vohor issued a strong plea for members of Parliament to remain loyal to their parties and not be lured by the Opposition to destabilize the [End Page 526] current coalition. This was followed by a public announcement by vp, ump, and Alliance ministers that the coalition continued to be solid (vdp, 19, 20, 21, 23 Oct 2010). However, by the end of November, Iauko sponsored yet another no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Natapei. All the leaders of the major parties were heavily involved in “Forgiveness Week” at the time and it appeared that the motion was just another attempt doomed to failure for lack of support. The reasons given for putting forward the motion included disapproval of the reduced budget tabled by the minister of finance, failure of the prime minister to raise the West Papua issue at the United Nations, and the decision of the prime minister to defer the msg meeting (vdp, 27 Nov 2010). The motion of no confidence was scheduled to be debated in Parliament on Thursday, 2 December. The prime minister appeared to be confident that his numbers were firm, as he decided that he would not attend the parliamentary session in order to take part in the Global Meeting on Climate Change in Mexico (vdp, 2 Dec 2010). Therefore, on the morning of the scheduled parliamentary session, Natapei was seen off at the airport by Sato Kilman, the deputy prime minister, along with two other Alliance ministers (Moana Carcasses and Paul Telukluk). It was reported that he asked Kilman if “everything was ok,” meaning whether the no-confidence motion was under control. Kilman confirmed that it was, they shook hands, and Natapei departed (vdp, 8 Dec 2010). A few hours later, when Parliament met for its afternoon session, Speaker George Wells (a member of the Alliance Group) banned all media and the public from the chamber (vdp, 8 Dec 2010). Once the members had convened, Kilman led his Alliance Group to cross the floor to join the Opposition, boosting its numbers to 30 out of 52. When the no-confidence motion was put to a vote, it was passed with 30 votes in favor, 15 votes against, and 7 abstentions. The resulting new coalition consisted of the Alliance Group (including the ppp and other small parties and independents), nup, and vrp. Sato Kilman (ppp and Alliance leader) was declared prime minister with Ham Lini (nup) as his deputy. The thirteen ministerial portfolios were allocated as follows: 7 to the Alliance Group, 2 to nup, 1 to vrp (plus the position of Speaker), and 3 to the Iauko faction of the vp (vdp, 3 Dec 2010). Significant was the allocation of the Ministry of Ni-Vanuatu Business Development to independent Port Vila mp and Alliance Group member Ralph Regenvanu—an indication of his growing influence within the Alliance Group and in politics generally. A further reshuffle occurred two weeks later when dissatisfaction arose over the allocation of portfolios. The new Opposition, consisting of the Natapei faction of the Vanua‘aku Pati (which was extremely angry over the way Natapei had been removed), the Union of Moderate Parties, and several independents, took the opportunity to try to topple Kilman. As is usual in Vanuatu politics, they were able to entice a few government members who were dissatisfied about the allocation of portfolios and other favors to sign the motion of no [End Page 527] confidence. New Speaker Maxime Carlot Korman, however, ruled that two of the signatures on the motion had been falsified and thus did not allow the motion to be debated. This allowed Kilman the opportunity to adjust the allocation of portfolios to strengthen his coalition with the Alliance Group giving up one portfolio to the vrp(vdp, 16 Dec 2010). In the meantime, the Opposition challenged the Speaker’s decision on the issue of signatures with the two members in question confirming that they had, indeed, signed the motion. The acting Speaker subsequently announced that the motion was in order with twenty-seven signatures and would be debated on 24 December (vdp, 17 Dec, 18 Dec 2010). The final chapter in this classic Vanuatu political drama occurred on 20 December, a few days before the scheduled debate, when ump President Serge Vohor deserted the Opposition and his vp “allies” to join the Kilman-led government. The ump received two portfolios: Vohor was allocated public works (his former position in the Natapei government) and Pentecost mp Charlot Salwai returned to his former ministry, education. As a result of the reshuffle, both the Alliance Group and the vrp gave up portfolios, with the effect of strengthening government numbers to the extent that they were no longer threatened by a vote of on confidence. True to form, Vohor pledged, as he had in 2009 when he joined the Natapei government, that the “ump will remain with the Government to the end of the term of this Government” (vdp, 21 Dec 2010). Natapei and his team had not seen what was coming, which is further evidence that the vp leaders seemed to have become somewhat disengaged from political realities. At least, they were clearly over-trusting of their coalition partners; otherwise, why would the prime minister have decided to travel out of the country—even to attend a meeting as representative for the Pacific Islands Forum—when his future was being debated? Not surprisingly, a few days after the change of government, the Daily Post printed an article from the Fiji Sun in which Commodore Bainimarama hailed the ousting of Natapei. The article also reported that the word from Vanuatu was that Natapei’s defeat was directly linked to his refusal to hand over the msg chairmanship to Bainimarama (vdp, 7 Dec 2010). There is little evidence, however, that serious disagreements had existed between the vp, ump, and Alliance Group over the West Papua and the msg chairmanship issues. Nevertheless, within a few days after taking office, Kilman and a delegation including the president of Malvatumauri, Chief Gratien Albuet, and several accompanying chiefs, flew to Honiara to attend the handing over of the msg leadership. Their intention was to carry out a full traditional Vanuatu reconciliation ceremony between the leaders of Fiji and Vanuatu before the official meeting took place, which was to happen despite the fact that Bainimarama did not plan to attend the meeting himself (vdp, 14 Dec 2010). Just where this alleged opposition to Natapei’s position came from is not clear. Was Kilman in disagreement all along with his former coalition partner and head of government [End Page 528] Prime Minister Natapei? Where did mp Regenvanu stand? And, most puzzling, what was the true position of Serge Vohor and his ump members? One explanation for the apparent lack of any sign of division between the coalition parties under Natapei prior to both votes of no confidence (a common pattern over the years) may simply reflect Vanuatu’s particular style of coalition politics. Cabinet members seem to have a free hand in formulating and implementing policies relating to their portfolios; there is a minimal obvious sense of collective responsibility for what takes place in government as a whole. Likewise, because Ni-Vanuatu prefer not to confront each other openly when there is disagreement, it is difficult to determine if a policy has the support of the government as a whole or simply that of a single minister. Very seldom are disagreements between ministers in government reported to the public. Thus, during the West Papua and msg debates, criticism of the government’s position (that is, Natapei’s position) came primarily from Opposition members and the public, not from members of the Alliance Group or the ump. It seems logical to conclude, therefore, that when Kilman and the Alliance Group toppled the prime minister and then the ump deserted the vp, they were driven less by disagreements over policies (though they may silently have had them) than by the desire to grab political power. The question remains whether or not Natapei and his team succumbed to Australian pressure to block Bainimarama’s bid for the msg chairmanship, or whether their decisions were based on an ongoing policy position that simply failed. Certainly, any accusation that the Natapei government had been persuaded to limit their engagement with Bainimarama appears to be an overstatement of the facts. Australian and Vanuatu foreign affairs personnel certainly discussed the msg situation, but there is nothing to indicate that Vanuatu’s position was bought and paid for. Australian aid to Vanuatu has been significant and ongoing since independence in 1980. There was nothing about the grants and funded projects during 2010 to suggest that any unusual effort was being made to influence the decisions of Vanuatu’s leaders. Indeed, the newspapers in Vanuatu ran stories almost every week about new aid-funded projects by an array of donors including Australia, New Zealand, France, Japan, China, the European Union, and others. Moreover, as noted earlier, Bainimarama came to Port Vila on several occasions for discussions, and the government persisted in its attempt to persuade the commander to alter his policy, despite local criticism in 2009, when it resisted pressure to support the sidelining of Bainimarama from the msg as the Forum had done. In July, when he departed to attend the “Engaging Fiji” meeting (which was subsequently renamed “Engaging with the Pacific”), Foreign Minister Natuman explained that the Government of Vanuatu had raised its concern with Bainimarama about handing over the chairmanship to Fiji as early as 2009. The decision to postpone the msg meeting was not in response to anything other than his refusal to deal with the issue of [End Page 529] restoring democracy in Fiji (vdp, 20 July 2010). The Natapei government had its position vis-à-vis Bainimarama undermined by weak political leaders both at home and abroad who simply did not understand the nature of the Fiji situation. In Vanuatu there is a general lack of awareness of the implications of the coup in Fiji, despite editorials in the local press and articles by Transparency Vanuatu that regularly point out how the rule of law and democracy have been threatened. Indeed, there is a widespread belief that Bainimarama has been good for Fiji—sorting out corruption, the race issue, and, being an indigenous Fijian himself, looking after Fijian interests. In this regard, few appear to understand the significance of his suspension of the operation of Fiji’s Great Council of Chiefs or of his blocking of the annual meeting of the Methodist Church. Clearly, the leader of the Opposition’s comment that “it was his belief that the decision was taken in the interest of foreign countries” indicates a lack of understanding, or perhaps his desire simply to score political points by using tired arguments of outside interference directed mainly against the Australian government, accusations that regularly pepper the Vanuatu press (vdp, 23 July 2010). Likewise, Kilman’s rush to reconcile with Bainimarama after taking over from Natapei indicates a degree of support that he never expressed as Natapei’s deputy prime minister and perhaps even an affinity as an ex-chief of police with a fellow member of the uniformed services. Howard Van Trease has over forty years’ experience carrying out research in the Pacific. He has taught Pacific history at the University of the South Pacific (usp) and the University of Hawai‘i at Hilo; was the founding director of the usp Centre in Vanuatu in 1980 and director of the usp centers in Kiribati and Nauru; and was director of distance and continuing education at usp and the University of Papua New Guinea. His main research interests are land tenure issues and politics in Vanuatu; he currently holds the position of honorary research fellow at the usp Emalus Campus in Port Vila, Vanuatu. References Independent, The Vanuatu Independent. Port Vila. Weekly. MacClancy, J V. 1984. Vanuatu since Independence: 1980–83. The Journal of Pacific History 19 (2): 100–112. Maclellan, Nic. 2010. Searching the Continental Shelf: Australia and France Explore Ocean Resources. Islands Business, December.
http://www.islandsbusiness.com/islands_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace Makin, Bob. 2010. Why Matthew and Hunter Islands Are Ours: Vanuatu Fights for the Two Islands. Islands Business, June.
http://www.islandsbusiness.com/archives/islands_business/index_dynamic/containerName pif, Pacific Islands Forum. 2010. Forum Communiqué. 41st Pacific Islands Forum, Port Vila, Vanuatu, 4–5 August. http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/ Van Trease, Howard. 1995. Melanesian Politics: Stael Blong Vanuatu. Christ-church: Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury; Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific. French version: La Politique Mélanésienne. ———. 2010. Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2009: Vanuatu. The Contemporary Pacific 22:467–476. vdp, Vanuatu Daily Post. Port Vila. [End Page 530] |
||
|